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Introduction
You are the brigade judge advocate for a U.S. Army
Stryker brigade combat team in the midst of a combat
deployment to Afghanistan. Arriving at the tactical
operations center one morning, you are accosted by the
brigade executive officer who tells you that the commander,
Colonel (COL) Smith, is looking for you. After you
dutifully report, the commander tells you about a significant
activity report that one of the battalion commanders,
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, recently submitted. The
report deals with one of the infantry companies, Alpha
Company, also known as "Kill Company," and its
engagement with the enemy the night prior, which resulted
in seven enemy killed in action and eighteen enemy
wounded; there were no U.S. or coalition casualties.
Colonel Smith tells you that upon seeing the report, he
contacted LTC Jones to congratulate him and discuss the
tactics, techniques, and procedures Kill Company had used.
"Jones told me that Kill used a baited ambush," COL
Smith informs you. "When I asked him what he meant, he
said that Kill had been in an engagement earlier in the day,
feigned breaking contact, and left its third platoon in an
overwatch position of the engagement area," he added. "The
platoon kept 'eyes on' and waited for a couple of hours until
the enemy returned to police up their dead and wounded.
Then third platoon opened up on them." Rubbing his
forehead with his hand, COL Smith closes with "I don't
know whether to recommend them for an award or start an
investigation. What do you think?"
This hypothetical is based, in part, on a news report that
U.S. forces in Afghanistan targeted enemy forces attempting
to collect their dead.' This note uses the hypothetical as a
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1 Greg Jaffe, 'Almost a Lost Cause': One of the Deadliest Attacks of the
Afghan War Is a Symbol of the US. Military's Missteps, WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/10/03/AR2009100303048.html?sid=ST2009100401053. The
article describes how a U.S. Army unit purportedly called in artillery fire on
insurgents who returned to the battlefield to collect their dead from an
engagement hours earlier. Members of the unit filmed the artillery strike
and can be heard laughing and cheering, which presents additional
challenges to a command. See also Michael Yon, Adam Ray, MICHAEL
YON ONLINE MAG., Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.michaelyon-
online.com/adam-ray.htm. In describing efforts by U.S. Army forces to
counter the IED threat in Afghanistan, Yon references a tactic that also
comes close to, if not enters, the law of war violation continuum discussed
infra. The U.S. military has been taking inventory of culverts, identifying
their exact locations and documenting them with photos and maps, and has
also embarked on a program to place barriers on culverts regularly used by
U.S. forces. Because the enemy continually tries to remove or circumvent
the barriers, small kill teams (SKTs) move from place to place, day and
vehicle to draw out the law and policy implications of such
targeting. Because assessments cannot be made divorced
from the specifics of the battlefield at issue, this note does
not attempt to answer the question of whether such targeting
is permissible. It neither discourages nor extols such
targeting. Instead, this note strives to inform judge
advocates in the field about the issues involved, and, in so
doing, seeks to better equip them to handle the challenging
questions such targeting raises.
Law or Policy?
Before considering the hypothetical, the applicable law
and policy that affect the issues and upon which any
assessment must be based should be examined. Academics
can easily descend into a legal inquiry from which extraction
is difficult by attempting to characterize the conflicts in
which the United States is currently engaged, the applicable
law of those conflicts, and even the triggers for the law's
application. However, from the military practitioner's
perspective, the answers to these issues are straightforward,
and they derive from policy rather than legal grounds.
Department of Defense's (DoD) policy directs that
"[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations."2 Under
this policy, the law of war is defined as
[t]hat part of international law that
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. .
. . The law of war encompasses all
international law for the conduct of
hostilities binding on the United States or
its individual citizens, including treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is a party, and applicable
customary international law.3
Consequently, the full panoply of the law of armed conflict
applies to the hypothetical in Afghanistan, but that answer
stems from U.S. policy and not a legal determination.
night, watching the culverts. The SKTs frequently call for fire that kills
men who have come to emplace bombs; when enemy forces arrive to collect
the bodies, the SKTs engage them, too.
2 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIR. 231 1.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 4.1 (9
May 2006) [hereinafter DODD 2311.01E].
Id. T 3.1.
The DoD policy, in addition to being required, provides a more
straightforward solution than the traditional "right person, right conflict"
legal analysis. As applied to the hypothetical, the right person analysis
would focus on the characterization of the "enemy" to determine whether
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What Is the Law?
The law most relevant to the baited ambush is the
Geneva Conventions, specifically the first Geneva
Convention (GC I), which protects wounded and sick
soldiers on land during war. Pursuant to article 15 of GC I,
[a]t all times, and particularly after an
engagement, Parties to the conflict shall,
without delay, take all possible measures
to search for and collect the wounded and
sick, to protect them against pillage and
ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care,
and to search for the dead and prevent
their being despoiled. Whenever
circumstances permit, an armistice or a
suspension of fire shall be arranged, or
local arrangements made, to permit the
removal, exchange and transport of the
wounded left on the battlefield. Likewise,
local arrangements may be conducted
between Parties to the conflict for the
removal or exchange of wounded and sick
from a besieged or encircled area, and for
the passage of medical and religious
personnel and equipment on their way to
the area.5
The Commentary to GC I describes the nature and
extent of the obligation. The Commentary notes that the
predecessor to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1929
Convention, while listing a similar responsibility, imposed
the obligation only "after each engagement" and only on
"the occupant of the field of battle."6 By contrast, article 15
the individuals are combatants or civilians and whether wounded or sick.
The right conflict analysis would consider whether the conflict was
international (Common Article 2) or nonintemational (Common Article 3)
in nature. The policy obviates the need for this complicated legal analysis,
standardizing the United States' approach in the process.
5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 15, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]. The International Committee of
the Red Cross, in its study of customary international law, found that "State
practice establishes [art. 15] as a norm of customary international law
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts."
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 406 (2005).
6 COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY] (quoting
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armies in the Field art. 3, July 27 1929, 47 Stat. 2021
[hereinafter 1929 GC). Under Article 3 of the 1929 GC,
[a]fter each engagement the occupant of the field of
battle shall take measures to search for the wounded
and dead, and to and to protect them against pillage
and maltreatment. Whenever circumstances permit, a
local armistice or a suspension of fire shall be
arranged to permit the removal of the wounded
remaining between the lines.
of GC I imposes the obligation "at all times" and on all the
parties to the engagement.
Returning to the hypothetical, the members of Kill
Company did have an obligation to search for and care for
the enemy wounded, as well as an obligation to search for
the dead and prevent them from being despoiled.7 But does
that mean that Kill Company, by not initially conducting
such a search or by leaviig third platoon to attack the enemy
when it returned to collect its dead and wounded, violated
the Geneva Convention? Not necessarily. Although the
plain language of the article requires Kill Company to take
all possible measures, the obligations of article 15 are not
absolute. As the Commentary notes, "there are times when
military operations will make the obligation to search for the
fallen impracticable."
How should the practitioner distinguish what is and is
not practicable? One answer is to imagine a continuum
ranging from least to greatest responsibility. Information
from the battlefield and unit in question would then guide
placement on the continuum. This information would
include the proximity, both geographical and temporal, of
the unit to the engagement area, the unit's disposition,
capabilities, and mission.
For example, consider two extremes. The first involves
an engagement in Afghanistan. A U.S. Army unit employs
indirect fire to wound or kill the enemy 5000 meters to the
north, and more significantly, down the ridgeline, across an
open and exposed valley, and up on another ridge line from
where the under-strength third platoon of Kill Company is
located. Kill Company has only been in the area a short
period of time, and the area is considered "insurgent
territory." Kill Company has also just received orders to
immediately move south. In contrast, the second example is
an urban engagement in Mosul, Iraq. The engagement
involves direct fire weapons at ranges of 100-200 yards.
Third platoon is at full strength, has been in the same combat
outpost for some time, and is not going anywhere any time
soon.
Placing the two scenarios on the same continuum, the
responsibility to search for the dead under article 15 is
considerably greater in the latter example. This reflects the
Commentary's recognition that "[t]he search for the fallen
combatants and their collection may present different aspects
according to circumstances."9 The Commentary continues
by acknowledging that
Id
The Commentary explains that "the wounded and sick must be guarded
and, if necessary, defended against all parties, whether military or civilian,
who may seek to lay hands on them. Id. at 152.
Id. at 151. -
9 Id.
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the commonest and the most important
case will be that of enemy troops retiring
in the face on an attack. The occupant of
the battlefield must then, without delay,
make a thorough search of the captured
ground as to pick up all the victims. The
dead must also be looked for and brought
back behind the lines with as much care as
the wounded.o
Ultimately, in the absence of an armistice or suspension
of fire, engaging combatants attempting to recover their dead
and wounded is not a per se violation of the law of war, but
utilizing known-or even suspected-enemy wounded and
dead as "bait" for such targeting enters the continuum and, at
some point, will constitute a violation of article 15. The
more time that passes following the engagement, the closer
the engagement is to U.S. forces, and the more control U.S.
forces have over the "field of battle," the more likely the
failure to search for enemy wounded and dead becomes to
violating the Geneva Convention.
Distinguishing Violations
Assuming arguendo that Kill Company's action (or
inaction) did constitute a violation of article 15, what then?
Too often, terms like "grave breach" or "war crime" are
thrown around without the requisite care for their definition
and application. To clarify, for the purposes of GC I, grave
breaches are
those involving any of the following acts,
if committed against persons or property
protected by the Convention: wilful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, and extensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly."
10I
" GC I, supra note 5, art. 50. To that list, the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) adds "compelling a prisoner
of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a
prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(GC IV) further adds "unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve
in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of
the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention,
taking of hostages." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
War crimes under the U.S. Code are
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the
international conventions signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such
convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23 [poison,
treachery, etc], 25 [attack of undefended
places], 27 [steps taken during siege or
bombardment to spare cultural property],
or 28 [pillage of town or place] of the
Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of
common Article 3 (as defined in
subsection (d)) when committed in the
context of and in association with an
armed conflict not of an international
character; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an
armed conflict and contrary to the
provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices as
amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996
(Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996),
when the United States is a party to such
Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious
injury to civilians. 12
Violating article 15 by itself13 is neither a grave breach
nor a war crime.14 Indeed there are countless ways by which
a State Party may violate the Geneva Conventions, very few
of them rising to the level of grave breach or war crime.
Which is not to trivialize such offenses; they are violations
of the law of war for which there are ramifications.
12 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2006).
13 A violation of article 15 that also involved willful killing of an enemy
hors de combat would rise to the level of a grave breach of GC I. Similarly,
an article 15 violation that included feigning a cessation of hostilities or the
killing or wounding of enemy soldiers attempting to surrender would
violate Hague IV. Either of those scenarios would constitute a war crime
under the U.S. Code, but the additional conduct, and not just the article 15
violation, push the offense over the threshold level.
14 But see U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE para. 499 (18 July 1956) (Cl, 15 July1976) (stating that "[t]he
term 'war crime' is the technical expression for a violation of the law of war
by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of
war is a war crime."). This approach, adopted in the 1956 version of Field
Manual 27-10, preceded the War Crimes Act and the trend of criminalizing
only the most "serious crimes" or "grave breaches" evident in recent
legislation. Compare the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a), with War
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
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Under the Geneva Conventions, "[e]ach High
Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
present Convention other than . . . grave breaches."" This
means that the United States has agreed to take action to
respond to violations of the first Geneva Convention, like
article 15, which do not rise to the level of a grave breach.
That action, or measures, should be designed to "suppress"
the prohibited behavior. While action could be taken under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it can also be
administrative, which includes reprimands, counseling, and
retraining. Potentially more significant to COL Smith, a
violation of article 15, and thus the law of war, is a
reportable incident under the DoD law of war program.
Conclusion
The purpose of this note is to remind practitioners of the
law and policy relevant to ambushes which utilize enemy
dead and wounded as "bait." Units are to be commended for
the agile and adaptive ways in which they bring the fight to
an amorphous enemy. Our job as judge advocates and as
legal advisors is to inform our commanders when their
means and methods of warfare tread close to the line
separating permissible conduct from law of war violations.
While ambushing the enemy when they are collecting their
wounded or dead may not be a war crime, such targeting
may incur more risk than units realize, or want, and any
short-term tactical advantage may be outweighed by the
ramifications of reporting and investigating a -possible
violation of the law of armed conflict.
15 GC 1, supra note 5, art. 50.
16 DODD 2311.01E, supra note 2, T 3.2. Under the Law of War Program, a
reportable incident is defined as "[a] possible, suspected, or alleged
violation of the law of war, for which there is credible information, or
conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute a
violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict." Id.
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